The title of this post is a quote by JP Morgan strategist David Kelly from this morning on Bloomberg. I don't think he's right. Much of my process specifically targets hedging the unknown. We talk all the time about client/personal holding BTAL being pretty reliable (not infallible) at going up when stocks go down. Whatever the reason causing stocks to drop, the Covid Crash, 2022, the Tariff Panic, BTAL has been reliable in this context.
TAIL and VIXM have also tended to go up when stocks go down, regardless of the reason of why stocks are going down.
You can build this yourself to see but the three different blends drawdown less than straight equity exposure pretty much every time.
I hovered on the 2022 low because 2022 was a pretty bad year for TAIL but that combo still was down less than the S&P 500.
Copilot weighed in, that "Kelly’s statement is directionally true in a classical risk‑management sense, but it’s not literally true once you introduce convexity, volatility‑linked hedges, and regime‑adaptive hedging tools like BTAL, TAIL, VIXM, VIXY, or managed futures. These instruments do hedge risks that are not explicitly “known” in advance — but they hedge them probabilistically, not specifically."
So essentially the difference is the text book versus real world. The emphasis in that passage is Copilot's, not mine.
That brings to a post from AQR about the mistake they see people making when they realize that bonds don't work for diversification in the manner that they used to so they are pivoting to exposures that actually have a higher correlation to equities than bonds, they are essentially adding more more equity beta to their portfolios, AQR says.
As I read the paper I started to think about barbelling a full equity exposure into a narrower slice of the portfolio which could come from leverage, using products that target more volatility or even with higher beta exposures in unlevered exposures.
Portfolio 4 is just SPY and the other three, the rest is cash. HFEQ targets twice the volatility, XLK is technology and simply has a higher beta and SSO is a levered 2x fund. The chart is so short because of HFEQ which was pretty close to the other three until it had a great month in February. I am guessing it pulled away from the others for being long a lot less tech. You can see the 70% XLK portfolio pull away to the downside as the private credit whatever we're calling it started to unfold.
Here's a longer term look at XLK that dials in a 74% weighting, 26% in cash, as being very close to 100% SPY.
The year by year results though show the two taking much different paths to the same result. So the flaw in this backtest is optimizing for XLK's lifetime instead of trying to dial in the year by year. I couldn't get the data Copilot needed to optimize minimal year by year dispersion.
Here's a similar backtest with 50% SSO/50% cash going back to SSO's inception 19 years ago.
They're not that far off from each other. Is that close enough? Maybe, maybe not, it depends on the user. I don't think any other fund compared like this with the 2x version of itself plus cash would be anywhere near as close but as we've been saying for a very long time, SSO stays pretty close over longer periods most of the time.
I wasn't able to find an alt to sub in for the cash to get a better return than SSO plus cash but I think that is because there were far fewer funds from 20 years ago versus today. It was a little easier to find some outperformance with newer funds and much shorter backtests.
There is something to this theory, it can work longer term. More realistically, 50% into a 2x levered fund is not the answer but maybe a smaller slice worked into a portfolio can be an answer.
Lastly, the Calamos L/S Equity & Dynamic Income Trust (CPZ), a closed end fund, popped up on my radar. It yields about 12%, it's leveraged up about 27%, it has done a good job in terms of not returning capital to make it's distribution, only six monthly payments included any ROC since it started paying out in December 2019 according to CEFconnect. It gets its yield from the leverage and then investing in preferred stocks and fixed income, it is not a derivative income fund. The long/short book is neutral biased so more like a market neutral or absolute return strategy.
CPZ first started trading at $20. On a price basis it is not keeping up with its distribution which should not be a huge surprise. The total return has compounded at 3.94%. The huge rally in 2021 appears to be from the fund zooming up to trade at a pretty large premium to its NAV. Copilot posited that the run up in 2021 was more about top down yield chasing than anything to do with the fund.
While I am not interested in using CPZ, I am intrigued by the l/s and yield combo. There will be a better mousetrap in this space.
This whole post was an exercise in sifting. I've used that word before. I spend a lot of time looking for ways to improve the portfolio which includes looking at strategies or funds that won't be able to do that.
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